25. FORT SUMTER - James SIMONS. Letter signed to Governor Pickens, assessing the tactical situation of Charleston Harbor, written five days after Robert Anderson moved his Federal forces into Fort Sumter. Charleston, SC: 1 January 1861. 6 pp., recto only, blue paper (300 x 198 mm).
[With:] An annotated manuscript diagram of Fort Moultrie, sent as an enclosure to the above. [Charleston: 1 January 1861]. 1 p. (535 x 412 mm).
the south carolina commander writes the governor outlining the strategic importance of fort sumter immediately following robert anderson's occupation of the fort.
A revealing and highly detailed report by Brig. Gen. James Simons, commanding the 4th Brigade of Charleston Militia, assessing the fortifications in Charleston Harbor, their relative strategic value, and the overall security of the harbor.
On 26 December 1860, Major Robert Anderson and his men left Fort Moultrie and occupied the unfinished Fort Sumter. By the time Simons wrote this report, South Carolina authorities had received word that President Buchanan was backing Anderson's move and that the U.S. revenue cutter Harriet Lane was en route with reinforcements for the small Union garrison. In this report, Simons states that he expects the Harriet Lane to arrive within 30 hours. Simons' report begins:
"I have carefully considered the orders extended to me by the Major General, which emanated from you Head Quarters yesterday and the plan of military operations & line of defence therein set forth. I cannot sacrifice to matter of Etiquette, questions & issues of such momentous importance as now surround us. I feel it to be my duty to report to you my opinion of the military movements which have been initiated … By the map which accompanies this paper, it will appear that your lines of communication with these points, as at present established, are directly within the range, and effective power of Fort Sumter-the Citadel of the Harbour, controlling every point. At the first return fire from Fort Sumter, your lines of communication are utterly cut off, with every single post, except perhaps Castle Pinckney. Let me simply observe, that you are indebted to the forbearance of the Enemy for the liberty of transporting the reinforcements & supplies, which you ordered at midnight, and which are to be sent this day at two o'clock, to your battery now in course of erection on Morris Island. A single Gun from Fort Sumter would sink your transport & destroy your troops & supplies. These lines of communication are the prime consideration of a General. It is vain to say others will be adopted. It is enough that they do not exist now & when the present resources fail, your troops will be wholly isolated & cut off from each other and the main…"
The report continues by evaluating Fort Moultrie: "This post is wholly untenable. Lt. Col. De Saussure, a brave Officer, gave you prompt notice of this fact, on the morning after his occupation. His report this morning shows you the imfragable [sic] proof of his first report, after nearly a week's occupation of the Post. Moreover he asks for supplies, which he applied to you for on the 30th inst. He urges me to supply these wants at the earliest practicable moment. Suppose he has them however. There is probably not a single man out of the whole force which he carried down who ever loaded a Siege Gun, or perhaps ever a single Gun of heavy calibre, munition or implement mentioned in the report. I know that as a fact, there is no ordnance force in his whole command. His Post must, even under the most favourable circumstances, fall to the Enemy after a very short & bloody contest. Suppose they evacuate the Post-where will they intrench themselves? Shall they resort to the Sandhills? If the enemy be reinforced by 250 U.S. artillery as is reported, he can land 200 men under the Guns of Fort Sumter and attack Lt. Col. De Saussure's command-an unequal contest between disciplined veteran troops, commanded by Educated and experienced officers, and raw militia who never saw battle. In the event of discomfiture to these brave young men, how can they make good their retreat from these Sandhills? Will it be said, there will be a causeway to the mainland, or other communication? The answer is the communication does not exist now & the issues will be upon us in less than 30 hours."
The report continues with similar evaluations of Fort Johnson, the Morris Island Battery, and continues by returning to his evaluation of the strategic superiority of Fort Sumter and of the ramifications of attacking the Harriet Lane to prevent Federal reinforcements from joining Anderson: "…Why all this preparation & expense if the work cannot but terminate in disastrous failure? Suppose however the Enemy be reinforced, and not fire a gun in reply to the Morris Island Battery. He can demolish our other posts when he pleases, from one of the most impregnable fortresses in the World and so our posts live at his will, and remain in our possession at his sufferance. Suppose however we succeed in preventing reinforcements from entering the Harbour. This will not prevent the U.S. Government from enforcing their revenue laws for this can be done outside the bar by a war Steamer, as well as inside by the Harriet Lane. Suppose however all your plans succeed, & Fort Sumter were in our possession-how would we raise the blockade of the war Steamer outside? If the Harriet Lane is not fired into, the preparations are unnecessary; if she is fired into, we have commenced open war…"
The report concludes with a warning to the Governor that the South Carolina forces are wholly unprepared for war and recommends that a more skilled General be placed in command of the forces. He writes: "I feel it to [be] my duty under all the circumstances above mentioned to express my convictions of the inexpediency of commencing actual hostilities on our side, in our present, wholly unprepared state-with raw, undisciplined troops-without equipments, munitions or proper arms-required to work armaments that need the highest skill & training-nothing but bloody discomfiture must attend the opening campaign…"
The conclusion of the report is that the occupation of Fort Sumter gave the Union control over the most vital fortification in Charleston Harbor, and that the other fortifications, including Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, Fort Johnson, and the batteries under construction of Morris Island, would quickly fall against a fully garrisoned Fort Sumter. Lines of communication would be cut, Southern ships would not be able to move in the harbor, and one of the most important ports in the South would be effectively lost.
When Pickens read this report he was furious, writing: "The conclusions of that report I consider would be to order troops from Fort Moultrie and Sullivan's Island and Pinckney, and to abandon the attempt to keep our reinforcements, and in fact yield without a struggle on every point, and thus break down the spirit of our people, and cover our cause with imbecility and probable ruin. I shall do no such thing, nor shall I hold any Council of War that may drive me to such conclusions!" (Meredith, Storm over Sumter, p. 82). Apparently the pessimistic tone of Simon's report made a greater impression on Pickens than its objective merits.
Fort Sumter was the crucial point in Charleston Harbor and the militia was not yet strong enough to take it. While Simons provides no answers on how to dislodge Anderson and his men, his frank report makes clear the absolute necessity of doing so.
In hindsight, it is evident that Simons had less cause for worry than he exhibited in his report. The rumor concerning the Harriet Lane turned out to be false, much to the relief of the South Carolina commanders. The expected reinforcements for Fort Sumter, aboard the Star of the West, did not arrive until 9 January. By this time, batteries were operational on Morris Island. Maj. Anderson would be on his own.
Simons's report stands as a critically important document of the Fort Sumter crisis. His frank and detailed exposition proves significant information about the disposition of militia forces in the early days of the confrontation, the risks South Carolina faced if open war was commenced in early 1861, and further proof of the anxiety provoked by the Union occupation of Sumter.
This report was published in a very scarce 1862 pamphlet titled The Record of Fort Sumter. As far as we are aware, all printed references to the report derive from this source. The report does not appear in the Official Records.
an extraordinary manuscript record of the beginning of the fort sumter crisis.
est. $10000 – $15000